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Relations in Japan and Their Historical Formation", The Kyoto University Economic Review, 
Vol. 35, No.2 (Oct. 1965) and Vol. 36, No.1 (Apr. 1966). 
I The Revival of the Labour-Movement after Japan's 
Defeat in World War n 
In Japan the organization of trade unions became prevalent after October 1945. 
I t was caused by severe inflation and the serious shortage of food, in short, by the 
complete breakdown which followed Japan's defeat in World War II. It was also 
promoted by orders from General Headquarters abolishing the Law for the Main-
tenance of the Public Peace and other oppressive laws and by the policy of protecting 
the trade union movement. As soon as workers organized trade unions, they went 
on strike demanding the democratization of offices and factories, the right to organ-
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ize trade unions, and triple or quintuple wage increases (in pre-war Japan we had 
not even a trade union law). 
The table below indicates the numbers of newly organized trade unions and 
the workers who joined them from 1945 (the year of Japan's defeat in World War 
II) to 1947. 
Numbers of Trade Unions & Members, 1945-1947 
1945 1946 1947 
After First Second First Second August S t Ha1fY. H. Y. H.Y. H. Y. ep. 
Number of 0 855 9,506 4,892 6.708 5,962 Trade Unions 
Number of 0 602,706 2,816,470 864,032 1,209,392 790,655 Union Members 
Number of Union 0 705 296 177 180 131 Members per Union 
(Source: The Labour Statistics & Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Labour~ Report on Labour Unions.) 
These trade unions were, in most cases, organized within individual enterprises, 
each of them being independent on other trade unions. Most of them consisted, 
not of factory workers alone, but of factory and office workers together. They were 
often called 'mixed trade unions', in which every employee, factory worker or office 
clerk, was obliged to join. In other words, as soon as a worker was employed by 
an enterprise as a regular employee, he was automatically obliged to be a member 
of the trade union in the enterprise and union duties were deducted from his wages 
or salary. Those who were not regular employees of the enterprise could become 
neither members nor leaders of the union. Thus, in the circumstances of the liberal 
airs and poverty-stricken life of post-war Japan, trade unions continued to be spon-
taneously organized at a fast tempo. They had an intra-enterprise-union character-
istic which involved the danger of them becoming unions of a vertical nature, that 
is trade unions secretly controlled by the managers. 
On the 10th October 1945, Komakichi Matsuoka, Suehiro Nishio, Minoru 
Takano, and other labour-movement leaders who had been active in pre-war days 
had a meeting at Tokyo Kuramae Kogyo Kaikan. There they talked about organ-
izing a national federation of trade unions and adopted a policy for organizing 
Sodornei (the Japan Federation of Trade Unions), the only nation-wide institution 
for organized workers in Japan, in spite of different opinions as to which political 
party to support. Other basic policies were to achieve the freedom to support any 
political party and to endeavor to rehabilitate the Japanese economy. It is said that 
Kyuichi Tokuda, Yoshio Shiga, Shoichi Kasuga, Ritsu ItO, Hiroshi Hasegawa, and 
other communists who were freed from jail agreed to these policies. 
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The communists at that time, whose principle was based on Red Unionism, 
could never align themselves with the 'socialist democrats' or 'social reformists' 
represented by Matsuoka and Nishio. For they were severely antagonistic to each 
other. In the Red Flag of 15th October the communists started to denounce 
Matsuoka, Nishio, and others: 
It is clear that those corrupt union officials are trying desperately hard to organize 
trade unions now and make the best use of them as their elective body or means for suc-
cess. But they are aware of no other way of organizing them than by connections, that 
is, by factions ... those damned corrupt union officials .. .let us purge those who betray 
workers! We must disclose the truth that they are the agents of imperialists and war 
criminals; we must attack their imperialism; we must reveal that they are enemies of 
democracy ... 
The communists took a leading part in organizing the Kanto District Liaison 
Council of Trade Unions which was formed on the 27th january 1946. Their 
activities were carried on in such a situation that the mutual relations and joint 
struggles carried on by intra-enterprise unions and the trend of industrial unions 
began to prevail between late 1945 and early 1946. Throughout the campaign they 
tried to organize a national institution of trade unions which could compete with 
Sodomei. Then, they organized industrial unions (for instance, the japan Press and 
Communication Workers' Union) which were to function as,the industrial organs 
of intra-enterprise unions for purposes ofliaison and joint struggles. Furthermore, 
they set up a preparatory meeting for the congress of industrial unions in February 
1946; finally they succeeded in establishing Sanbetsu Kaigi (the Congress of In-
dustrial Unions of japan) on the 19th August 1946. Twenty-one industrial unions 
consisting of 1,574, 169 members joined it. 
In the meantime those who intended to organize Sodomei continued to stren-
gthen the organization in competition with the communists. At last they organized 
Sodomei on the 1st August 1946, a short time before the establishment of Sanbetsu 
Kaigi. Sodomei was joined by 1,466 trade unions belonging to the preparatory 
meetings of 34 prefectural federations and consisting of 660,460 members, and by 
463 trade unions belonging to the four industrial unions (thejapan Legaue of Trans-
portation and Traffic Workers' Unions, the National Federation of Textile Industry 
Workers' Unions, the National Tobacco Workers' Union, and the National League 
of Mine Workers' Unions) and consisting of 401,439 members. The trade unions 
belonging to it totalled 1,699, and the workers 855,399 (deducting those that joined 
both the prefectual federations and industrial unions). It was characteristic of 
Sodomei that the trade unions belonging to it greatly delayed in organizing industrial 
unions where as the prefectural federations were dominant. The misfortune in the 
labour movement in pre-war japan, that trade unions had often split because of 
their opposing political stands, was reiterated after the revival of the labour move-
ment in post-war japan. 
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What measures did these two national institutions of trade unions intend to 
take for protecting the livelihood of the workers? 
Sodomei urgently propagated the slogans of its campaign as soon as it was or-
ganized. These slogans contained all the necessary items for protecting the wor-
kers'livelihood. Some of them were 'Equal pay for equal work', 'Equal opportunity 
of same work and promotion for men ond women', 'Let us conclude collective agre-
ements and hold joint consultations', and 'Let us drive out vertical unions and build 
up a large-scale industrial union'. 
In October 1946, the significant so called 'October struggle' was opened by San-
bestu Kaigi. In the slogans there was a item:- 'Let us obtain unified collective 
agreements on the industrial level'. Also among the slogans adopted at the inau-
gural meeting of Sanbetsu Kaigi there was the item :- 'Equal pay for equal work'. 
Sanbetsu Kaigi grew out of the development of intra-enterprise unions through 
federations of these unions into local councils and district councils of trade unions; 
Sodomei consisted of federations of intra-enterprise unions classified by industry or 
prefectural location. These conditions considered, it was an inevitable precondition 
for industrial unions to conclude unified collective agreements on the industrial 
level. Without them it would not be possible to achieve the industrial unification 
of workers. Under circumstances where trade unions were organized by the emplo-
yees within an enterprise and that wages and other working conditions were con-
cluded independently by each enterprise in post-war Japan, it was of the utmost 
importance to break the limit of intra-enterprise unions and to succeed in the 
agreement and standardization of working conditions by force of unified collective 
agreements on the industrial level. Doing so was by all means necessary to realise 
the true industrial unification of workers beyond the framework of the individual 
enterprise. 
Unified collective agreements on the industrial level mean a change in the 
system of payment, and in individual wages in an enterprise. Without the change 
Japanese trade unions cannot establish themselves as autonomous unions. They 
cannot develop autonomously without the standardization of wages and other 
working conditions not bound by the framework of the enterprise. It can be said 
to have been a tragedy in the Japanese labour movement that the leaders of trade 
unions did not realize the truth. For the slogan that 'Equal pay for equal work, 
proposed by Sanbetsu Kaigi and Sodomei remained a mere slogan, and its true signi-
ficance was not understood by them. 
As a result of Sanbetsu Kaigi's October struggle in which it was an object to 
obtain unified collective agreemants on the industrial level, the trade unions won 
the so-called 'Densan wage system', a wage system which the Council of Electric 
Power Industry Workers' Unions achieved, which was to guarantee the minimum 
living cost by age and which was quite different from the principle of 'Equal pay for 
equal work'. This came to be generally adopted later, by the trade unions belong-
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mg to Sanbetsu Kaigi as the ideal doctrine for wage campaigns. The subor-
dination of trade unions to management actually occurred in the most favourable 
conditions for the former, while the latter were politically and economically wea-
kened. 
II The Revival Process of the Seniority-Wage SysteDl 
and Trade Unions 
Backed up by the threat of cutting off the electricity and by the surprise en-
forcement of the Labour-Mangement Adjustment Law, the Council of Electric 
Power Industry Workers' Unions carried out a 54 day labour dispute demanding 
wage increases and came to an agreement on the 30th November 1946, which, almost 
completely achieved their demands. The so-called 'Densan wage system' was a 
seniority-wage system which was to guarantee the minimum standard of living and 
which was made up of the minimum wage by age group, family allowance, service-
length allowance, and pay according to ability. 
The Densan wage system which arose out of the demand to 'Pay us the 
minimum wage based on the cost ofliving', put a stress on the 'basic wage' together 
with an eight-hour working day and a women's periodic illness holiday. It was to 
slide with the fluctuation of prices, and the sum of payment was a net amount 
credited against income tax. For example, the basic wage was ¥500 for those who 
were less than 17 years old, ¥500 plus ¥30 per year for those betwen 18 and 30, and 
¥20 per year additionally for those between 31 and 40 with no more additional pay 
for those older than 41; the family allowance was ¥200 for the first family member 
and ¥150 per head for the others; the service-length allowance was ¥IO per year; 
and the pay according to ability was ¥800 on the average. 
The achievement of the Densan wage system was an epoch making event in two 
senses: first, the Council of Electric Power Industry Workers' Unions, breaking up 
the structure of payment completely controlled by the management, clarified for 
itself the standard of the respective wages of the workers; second, a unified col-
lective agreement was concluded between the Council of Electric Power Industry 
Workers' Unions and the Japan Electric Power Generation and Transmission Com-
pany and the nine district electric power supply companies. But this wage system 
was against the fundamental principle that wages were to correspond to the quality 
and quantity of labour, as long as the wage system guaranteed the minimum stan-
dard of living by age. Though it contained pay according to ability which was to 
'be based on a certain standard of assessment in respect to the technique, ability, ex-
perience, and knowledge ofa worker', it only offered additional pay ofless than ¥800 
and the method of assessment was solely dependent on the management. In this 
sense pay according to ability was not part of the wages which corresponded to 
the quality of labour. 
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Originally the wage paid according to the quality oflabour is not pay accord-
ing to ability which is given in addition to the minimum cost of living by age 
groups, but it is the rate of payment set according to the quality and quantity of 
labour, not according to age, length of service, and experience. Elements such as 
age, length of service, experience, and educational background are appraised only 
in so far as they are connected with the quality of labour. 
The Densan wage system was nothing but a rearranged seniority-wage system, 
a capitalistic system ofwages 1>. It was possible for capitalists to reestablish it as the 
seniority-wage system in their own favour, if only they could succeed in controlling 
the assessment of labour and in forming intra-enterprise agreements instead of 
unified collective agreements. In fact, capitalist succeeded in changing the Densan 
wage system into the seniority-wage system favoured by them. They made use of 
pay according to ability and assessment of labour by managers. Thus, they re-
established the seniority-wage system so as to serve themselves. That the relative 
ratio of pay according to ability to subsistence pay in the wage system increased 
meant for managment an increase of their own power of speaking, as shown by the 
table'> below: 
Table of the Ratios of Pay according to Ability to Subsistence Pay 
Year I Subsistence Pay I Pay according to Ability 
I 
Sept. 1947 73.5% 26.5% 
1948 73.5 26.5 
1949 74.6 25.3 
1950 74.1 25.9 
1951 70.7 29.3 
1952 64.2 35.8 
1953 59.3 40.7 
1954 60.7 39.3 
1955 I 60.9 39.1 
In the case of the Tokyo Electric Power Supply Comapny, the wage system was 
replaced in 1955 by one based on position and ability. This system included the 
following principles: I) The basic wage is to be fixed in accordance with the appra-
ised quality of labour and the total evaluation of a workers merits; 2) The basic 
wage is to be adjusted in April, every year; 3) The minimum wage is to be set in 
1) The Councilor Electric Industry Workers' Unions substantiates this in its statement that "the 
new Deman wage system is noting but a revival of the essential rule of wages in an old-fashioned 
way, which is derived from the analysis of past wage systems". 
2) T. Yoshimura, Wage Campaigns in Japan, pp. 37-38. 
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accordance with the age and length of service of a worker and to be paid in case the 
basic wage is lower than the minimum wage. 
Densan (the japan Electric Power Industry Workers' Union) was the most 
powerful industrial union of those belonging to Sanbetsu Kaigi. But it began to 
break down in October 1949, just before the promulgation of the Ordinance for 
Reorganizing the Electric Power Industry, when approximately half of the members 
of the Kanto district headquarters withdrew from the union in opposition to its 
'too radical campaign', and organized an independent union named the Kanto 
Electric Power Supply Workers' Union in December 1949. In the Densan dispute 
which took place in the autumn of 1952, the management straightforwardly 
rejected the principle of 'Equal pay for equal work' insisting the principle of 
'Individual bargaining and payment on the enterprise level'. Thus, Densan was 
faced with the growing danger of breaking into intra-enterprise unions. In conse-
quence of the continual withdrawal of members and the failure in the prolonged 
86 day dispute, the dissolution of Densan became decisive. In early 1953 workers' 
secessions from Densan became more frequent, and the movement of Densan tow-
ards intra-enterprise unions increased. Finally Densan actually dissolved in july, 
when a preparatory meeting was held in order to form a I)ational federation of el-
ectric power industry workers' unions. In this way DenrDren (the National Federa-
tion of Electric Power Industry Workers' Unions) was formed in May 1954, which 
was a federation of intra-enterprise unions in the electric power industry. 
Densan, which had had an exceptional success in the conclusion of a unified col-
lective agreement, took pride in its strong influence as a single industrial union. In 
fact, however, "it was nothing but the nation-wide federation of intra-enterprise 
unions of the japan Electric Power Generation and Transmission Company Wor-
kers' Union on the one hand and the trade unions of the nine district electric power 
supply compaines on the other, whose weakness was covered by the strong central-
ization of power. For this reason Densan was obliged to hold consultations with the 
member unions in regard to the ordinary management of the institution, though in 
the case of struggles for wage increases and conclusion of agreements it made the 
best use of its centralized power."') "Even though it appeared to be a single industrial 
union, Densan was actually a federation of intra-enterprise unions in character. "4) 
It is an essential duty for an industrial union autonomosuly to set a rate of pay-
ment corresponding to the quality and quantity of labour by an industrially unified 
collective agreement. But Densan caused itself to break up and change wrongly 
into intra-enterprise unions because it acquired the wage system by age groups which 
guaranteed the minimum cost of living of the workers. 
3) A Rearch on the Actual Conditions of Labour Disputes in Post-War Japan, The Dispute of 
Densan, pp. 50-51. 
4) Ibid., p. 48. 
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In such promlsmg situations when wages were to some extent standardized 
though the Japanese living standard was low, and when labour's power had 
overwhelmed management, the Japanese trade unions missed a very rare chance of 
realizing the slogan of 'Equal pay for equal work'. On account of the labour-man-
agement relations based on seniority which survived from pre-war days, Japanese 
workers had intense enterprise-conciousness, so that they were ignorant of the 
necessity of autonomously setting wages and other working conditions, which was 
the core of the functions of trade unions. Many leaders of Sanbetsu Kaigi and the 
leftwing unions, especially communists, were certain that industrial unions should be 
the fundamental organizations for the contemporary labour movement, also having 
in mind an idea of unified collective agreement. On the contrary, the officials of 
Densan did not understand the significance of industrially regulating and standard-
izing wages and other working conditions by force of industrial unions. Neither 
did many scholars. 
Before the enforcement of the Densan wage system, the U.S. Labour Advisory 
Committee had already criticized the Japanese wage system and given advice to the 
Japanese government and private enterprise as follows: 
We, the members of the U.S. Labour Advisory Committee, believe that the present 
system of wages based on age, sex, and marital status is economically unsound, unequal 
to employees, and helpful in promoting employment customs which should be expelled 
in the future. As the present system is, in setting the wage of an employee, based on 
his individual circumstances and not on the degree of his contribution to the enterprise, 
it can be said to be uneconomic from the viewpoint of production cost. And if a worker 
is paid a high wage simply because he is aged in spite of the simple skill of and the light 
responsibility for his labour, such a system as would admit this is unequal. 
Furthermore, the present system is likely to promote the employment of children in 
consequence of great differences in wages between the aged worker and the younger. In 
the same manner a married job~seeker is disadvantageous in competition with a single 
job·applicant, in case an employee's marital status is taken into account in setting the 
wage. There is no room for defending the system by whose regulation a female worker 
is paid a lower wage than a male worker even if she works as well as or even better than 
he. 
For these reasons we advise the Japanese governament and private enterprises to 
make an effort to establish a sound system of wages based on the assessment of a worker's 
ability, that is, a system of wages and salaries based not on an employee's personal 
conditions such as age, sex, and marital status, but on the duty and responsibility neces-
sary to his labour. 
In spite of the radical transformation of Japanese society caused by defeat in 
the war and the great prosperity of the labour movement, the wage system based on 
seniority still held good, which was set in consideration of workers' age, length of 
service and family. This was a wage system, as pointed out by the U.S. Labour 
Advisory Committee, which had no room for being defened in regard to its raison 
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d'etre, for it helped promote some employment customs which should be expelled in 
the future. 
Densan of its own accord enforced an indefensible, unfair wage system based on 
seniority, a system by age groups which guaranteed the minimum cost ofliving of the 
workers. The Japanese trade unions at that time failed to understand the signi-
ficance not only of the advice given by the U.S. Labour Advisory Committee but also 
of the report made by the Inspection Party of the World Federation of Trade Unions 
in Japan (investigation carried out from the 24th March till the 7th April, 1947; 
Report issued in July, the same year). The report of the W.F.T.U. Inspection 
Party reads: 
The wage regulations in industries including government enterprises are not based 
on the workers' ability for business, nature of work, and quality and quantity of labour 
done. Some regulations set wages according to a worker's age and length of service. 
We could not find basic wage for both male and female workers ... 
Such a system of wages is open to the misuse and discriminative treatment of em· 
players at their disposal. Apart from the fact that it is irrational and uneconomic in 
itself. Wages must be founded on the qualification of a worker and his ability for work. 
The basic part of wages should be separated from additional allowances for family and 
aged relatives, and be equal to the entire body of employees irrespective of age or 
qualification ... 
Thus, straightforwardly, criticizing the Japanese wage system, the W.F.T.U. In-
spection Party suggested in its report that the principle of 'Equal pay for equal work', 
should be brought into being through a unified collective agreement, and stated that 
"collective agreements must be universalized in order to revise this system; and it is 
necessary for both labour and management to discuss it and draw a conclusion." 
Japanese trade unions overlooking the advice of the U.S. Labour Advisory Com-
mittee and the report of the W.F.T.U. Inspection Party owing to their ignorance of 
the functions of trade unions and the principle of wages, management came to misuse 
the wage system at their disposal and unjustly discriminated against workers. In 
order to solve this problem there was no other way than that offollowing the sugges-
tion of the W.F.T.U. Inspection Party. Unfortunately, however, most of the 
leaders of Japanese trade unions have not yet understood this, as will be explained 
later. Here lay the greatest and most fatal weakness of the Japanese unions. 
The October campaign, which was taken part in by large trade unions in private 
enterprises under the leadership of Sanbetsu Kaigi and which brought forth the 
Densan wage system, became very intense as a result of the joint struggle with the 
Japan Council of National and Public Government Workers' Unions. The cam-
paign joined in the opposition party's movement to overthrow the cabinet; finally 
-it deVeloped into the February the First General Strike (the 1st February 1947) 
planned with slogans such as 'Let us start production again and set up a people's 
government'. 
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Though this general strike was stopped by order of General MacArthur, Sup-
preme commander of the occupation forces, the working class elected the Socialist 
Party as the leading party in the general election of April 1947. As a result the Ka-
tayama Coalition Cabinet was founded. This cabinet helped oligopolistic capital 
grow rapidly by setting a wage base of ¥1,800 per month, thus sacrificing the 
working class. The Katayama Cabinet proclaimed a 'new system of prices' in July 
1947. At the same time the cabinet fixed average wages of¥I,800 for manufactur-
ing industry, ¥2,441 for the shipbuiding industry and ¥1,124 for the silk manufactur-
ing industry, between which average wages for 3,215 categories of industry were 
fixed. This policy was intended to stabilize both prices and wages in the following 
way: the prices of essential commodities were to be set 65 times as high as those in 
1935, and the standard of wages, a constituent of prices, was to be set 26 times 
as high as that in 1935; in case the cost prices of essential commodities exceeded 
the set prices, the government was to pay price subsidies to the suppliers to stop the 
price rising above the standard. 
Apparently this measure was employed for the purpose of stopping wages from 
rising above such a low standard. For under radical inflation and an excessive 
issue of inconvertible notes, rapid price rises of essential commodities were una-
voidable, and yet wages were fixed at a level only 26 times as high as pre-war days, 
though the upper part of the prices of essential commodities more than 65 times as 
high were made up for by the payment of price subsidies to the suppliers. It was 
quite natural that the ¥1,800 wage base was at once rejected by the trade unions 
but it was supported by Sodomei which backed up the Coalition Cabinet of Socialist 
Prime Minister Katayama. 
In spite of the fact that production remarkably decreased in post-war Japan (the 
rate of production was less than 20% compared to that of pre-war days), the exces-
sive issue of inconvertible notes continued and substantial wages were greatly 
lowered. 
The tables (p. II) show the excessive issues of Bank of Japan Notes and the 
indices of nominal and substantial wages respectively. 
The wage base of ¥1,800 not merely meant a horrible low-wage policy, fixing 
wages only 26 times as high as in 1935, whereas the prices of manufactured com-
modities were fixed 65 times as high and those of agricultural goods 47 times as high 
respectively, but also involved a serious problem in respect of its nature as the average 
wage over a large number of different categories of industry. The average wage is 
the average sum of pay per capita which is the quotient of the sum total divided by 
the number of employees. This is a basis for management to calculate personnel 
expenses, but not the wages of respective workers. Consequently in any way of 
paying wages to workers, management have complete control over the right to 
distribute the sum total. In distribution, management distinguish employees by 
education, type of employment (normal employment of new graduates, intermediate, 
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Nominal Wages and Indices of Substantial Wages in Manufacturing Industry (Monthly) 
11 
Date I Nominal Wages I Index of Substantial Wages 
1943-1936 50.6 yen (Average Sum) I 100.0 
1946, Aug. 532.0 18.8 
Sept. 584.0 22.5 
Oct. 596.0 26.5 
Nov. 688.0 28.8 
Dec. 970.0 34.8 
1947, jan. 833.0 27.0 
Feb. 879.0 28.5 
Mar. 932.0 27.6 
(Source: Annual Report of Labour Statistics and Investigation, 1949.) 
regular or temporary employment and so on), length of service, age and sex, in 
addition to the evaluation of a worker's merits and the assessment of his efficiency'). 
5} The idea of an average wage was conceived not only by capital but also by labour. In the 2nd 
September 1946, the Hokkaido branch of the National Council areoal Miners' Unions claimed to 
the League of Coal Mine Industry in Hokkaido "as the minimum sum the average wages of ¥50 
a day for an underground worker and Y35 for a surface worker and a guard to be put in force from 
the 1st September, provided that the basic wage be made 60% and the other allowances 40% 
excluding the legal family allowance of ¥20". The National Council of Coal Miners' Unions 
claimed on the 27th January to the Japan League of Coal Mine Industry average monthly pay of 
¥1,455 for a surface worker and ¥1,955 for an underground worker, suggesting the 'establishment 
of a mjnimum~wage system based on the cost ofliving', an idea strongly influenced by the Densan 
wage system. These two sums were considered the monthly minimum living cost for surface and 
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Even in an exceptional case. when the right to fix wages was used by trade uni-
ons as in the case of the Densan wage system, such wage system were mutilated or 
counterattacked by management. They were changed into seniority-wage systems, 
intra-enterprise wage systems with no unified rate of wages, because of the mana-
gement's rejection of industrially unified bargaining and the individual unions' com-
plete freedom from the regulation of industrial unions. Such a change in wage systems 
was further promoted by the 'pay for the job' system of¥2,920 base for government 
and public workers, which was proposed in March 1948. The new wage base was 
also to direct the wage level of workers in private factories and offices. Though dir-
ectors and managers of both public and private enterprises were ignorant and 
incapable of the analysis and assessment of job positions, such situations somewhat 
indicated their intention of opposing the wage system by which wages increased 
steadily in accordance with age and length of service owing to the influence of the 
trade unions. Taking advantage of this opportunity, large enterprises began to 
study the 'pay for the job' system. The 'pay for the job' system of¥2,290 base did 
not take the place of the seniority-wage system; but it was at least intended to 
replace the the principle of distributin wages according to seniority by management's 
arbitrary analysis and assessment of the job. In other words, management intended 
to introduce a wage system advantageous to themselves by which they could con-
trol the sum alloted for wages by means of the average wage, and the distribution 
by means of the pay for the job so as to stop the increase of the sum total. The 
pay for the job system was also a means for management to recover their lost power 
over wage administration which had been retarded by the active labour movement 
in post-war Japan. The basic wage policy of management today (1960's) can be 
found in the pay for the job policy based on seniority. And it has steadily been 
brought into effect in large enterprises despite the active counterstruggles of the 
trade unions. 
As stated above, the Densan wage system was actually the first step, the average 
wage of ¥ 1,800 base the second, and the wage of ¥ 2,920 the third towards 
the wage system based on seniority. When these-the actual breakdown of San-
betsu Kaigi (1950) and the strengthening of intra-enterprise unions closely con-
nected with management's wage policy in its own favour-were combined with 
seniority wages, a wage system based on seniority could be said to have been reestabl-
ished. The formation of Sahya (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) 
was symptomatic. Wage struggles were aimed at a raise in the wage base since the 
underground workers, respectively, aged thirty and having a small family. There was a difficuI~ 
ty in collective bargaining, which was broken off once. The formal agreement concluded on the 
12th April 1947 was an average wage agreement proposed by the League, to which the Council 
agreed on the assumption that the monthly pay of¥IA45 could at least be secured. The Coun-
cil's idea of average wages was, like the ones under the Densan wage system, naturally to be de-
veloped into the minimum-wage system distinguished by age group and family structure. 
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enforcement of the average wage system, though the initiative was taken by manage-
ment. U nti! today most wage struggles have been along this line. In the days 
we have discussed there were very few, in academic circles, the press, or even trade 
unions themselves, who correctly understood the important function of the trade uni-
on-the autonomous enforcement of minimum rates of wages (by colletive agree-
ments) based on quality and quantity of labour'l. 
In The Establishment of Intra-Enterprise Unions 
and the Formation of Sahya 
-The Breakdown of Sanbetsu Kaigi-
Now I will discuss the establishment of intra-enterprise unions and the enfor-
cement of the wage system based on seniority-the establishment of Japanese labour-
management relations-taking up firstly the breakdown of Sanbetsu Kaigi (the 
Congress of Industrial Unions of Japan) and secondly the formation of Sc;hyc; (the 
General Council of Trade Unions of Japan). As discussed above, the labour move-
ment in post-war Japan, which had again begun with the aim of organizing Sc;dc;mei 
(the Japan Federation of Trade Unions), actually aplit in late 1945; its place was 
taken by the movement for the congress of factory representatives, under the gui-
dance of the communists, and its principle was based on red unionism; then, 
out of the body of Kanw Rc;kyc; (the Kant!) Council of Trade Unions) Sanbetsu 
Kaigi arose in August 1946, which composed the main current in the labour move-
ment in post-war Japan. In this process, an anti-communist movement was formed 
and developed, and Sanbetsu Kaigi broke down and Sc;hyc; was established. 
One of the characteristics of the labour movement right after the end of the war 
was that many labour disputes occurred; and the trade unions often used the tactic 
of managing production by themselves. The movement "took a radical measure, 
being apt to cause more or less violent incidents"'l. Such production management 
formed the basis of the labour disputes led by the Communist Party, which advo-
cated 'the rehabilitation of production by the people' and 'the nationalization of 
essential industries and management by the people'. It "became influential as a 
predominant tactic in labour disputes. "Bl But this movement was stopped for a 
time in the middle of 1946 because of the difficulties of finance, procurement of raw 
materials, and sale of products, in addition to severe suppression by the government. 
Needless to say, such a tendency in the movement gave rise to antagonism against 
the communists. 
6) See Eitaro Kishimoto, A History of J1l age TJuories in Japan, Chapter II. 
7) Matsuta Hosoya, The Trade Union Movement in .lapan, p. 74. 
8) Ibid., p. 75. 
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From August till September 1946, just after its establishment, Sanbetsu Kaigi, 
by taking part in the large dispute of the Japan Seamen's Union and the National 
Railway Workers' Union which opposed mass discharges, succeeded in making the 
authorities completely withdraw the discharge program. Increased employment 
in wartime had caused a great number of supernumeraries to be employed in both 
public and private enterprises that had then either been destroyed or reduced to a 
great extent. Reviving capital and the Yoshida Cabinet adopted a hasty policy 
for consolidating enterprises and attempted to solve this problem at a stroke. They 
gave discharge notices to 60,000 seamen and 75,000 workers on the Japanese Nati-
onal Railways. The Japan Seamen's Union and the National Railway Workers' 
Union, with the support of Sanbetsu Kaigi, overcame internal confrontation; then 
they established the leadership of the leftwing faction, and finally gained the com-
plete withdrawal of the discharge notices. This success, however, deepened the 
confrontation between the group which rejected discharges and the one which, ad-
mitting the inevitability of the discharges, advocated a policy of decreasing the 
number of workers to be dismissed. As a result of this confrontation there was a 
strong reaction against the leftwing faction which was connected with Sanbetsu 
Kaigi and the Communist Party. 
Following the great dispute of the Japan Seamen's Union and the National Rail-
way Workers' Union, Sanbetsu Kaigi opened a large-scale struggle in October with 
552,000 participant mainly from large unions in private enterprises. In December 
Sanbestu Kaigi combined with the Japan Council of National and Local Govern-
ment Workers' Unions to advance towards the February the First General Strike 
scheduled for the 1st February 1947. It set the goal at 'overthrowing the Yoshida 
Cabinet and establishing a democratic people's government'. In this struggle a 
united front of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party came into being for 
the first time, and the joint struggle of Sanbetsu Kaigi and Sodomei made progress. 
It was because "though the Socialist Party and Sodomei were to some extent criti-
cal of the Communist Party and Sanbetsu Kaigi in respect to their leadership and 
actions, they could not help but support the demands of the working masses who 
made a strenuous effort to succeed in the February the First General Strike."') 
The plan of the February First General Strike was, however, stopped by General 
MacArthur on the 31st January 1947. Since then, feelings and criticism became 
rapidly intensified against the Communist Party and Sanbetsu Kaigi. The demand 
for self-criticism became widely prevalent among workers. Thus, "every organi-
zation was more or less faced with the necessity of reforming the constitution." In 
the N.R.W.U. rally held in March 1947, a motion was proposed that no union official 
should be a member of the Communist Party. In the June rally of the same union 
the rightwing faction succeeded in controlling the executive. Withdrawals of wor-
9) Ibid., p. 99. 
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kers continued from leading unions belonging to Sanbetsu Kaigi, such as the All 
Communications Employees' Union, the All-japan Press Workers' Union, the All-
japan Machine & Instrument Industry Workers' Union, the General Federation of 
Printing and Publishing Workers' Unions, and the All-japan Electric Industry Wor-
kers' Union. Thus, these unions continued to fluctuate. 
In consequence of such fluctuations inside these trade unions, Sanbetsu Kaigi 
conducted some self-criticism. In May 1947 the managing board of Sanbetsu Kaigi 
announced the following official self-criticism: I) Sanbetsu Kaigi had a tendency 
to drive every struggle into a strike. We should have carried out a more flexible 
ordinary campaign; 2) we gave the working masses the impression of being under the 
direct guidance of the Communist Party; 3) our movement was not conducted in 
a democratic way. 
The self-criticism of the managing board was at once brought into the executive 
committee, which made it public with a new policy!O). Concerning this, the execu-
tive of Sanbetsu Kaigi opposed the Communist Party. In the convention for self-
criticism held by Sanbetsu Kaigi on the 10th july 1947 "many self-critical statements 
were expressed, such as 'the February the Fist General Strike went too far', 'the 
communist faction is dictatorial' or 'the communist Dietmen decreased from 6 to 3, 
despite the support of Sanbetsu Kaigi which is said to have 1,800,000 members'. 
"The rally, however ended in the rejection of the already proclaimed self-
criticism and in the "affirmation of a resolution that there was no error in past 
guidance."!!) Thus, "after the convention most cOJpmunist members of the ex-
ecutive committee of Sanbetsu Kaigi obeyed the directions of the Communist Party, 
but many communist clerks in the executive office strongly resisted the opinions of 
and measures from the head office of the Communist Party. This resistance de-
veloped into a serious antagonism among the higher organs of Sanbetus Kaigi." 12) 
The rejection of this self-criticism in the convention implied that the members' 
feelings and criticism-the demand for the democratization of unions-against the 
communist group in Sanbetsu Kaigi with the Communist Party behind it, which had 
been trying to force the working masses into frequent strikes and political struggles, 
were regarded as mere maneuvers of the anti-communist members; it also implied 
that the important significance of the 'self-criticism' has been completely overlooked. 
10) A Short History of Sanbetsu Kaigi rightly indicates this: It was owing to a great change of con-
ditions that Sanbetsu Kaigi~ which had been struggling ever since its establishment in August 
the previous year, was obliged to carry out self-criticism; at the same time it was owing to the wor-
kers' demand that Kaigi take a reasonable attitude as a trade union. There was a difficulty in 
that~ though this had been made public in the criticism against the attitude of the leaders on the 
occasion of the October struggle and the February the First General Str.ike, it was ignored or 
rather suppresssed. p. 48. 
11) Minoru Takano, The Labour Movement in Japan, p. 71. 
12) Matsuta Hosoya, oj). cit., p. 105. 
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In consequence of this convention Sanbetsu Kaigi was dissolved as a result of the 
frustration of local struggles for paralyzing local authorities which were directed by 
the communist group, and of the further development of the anti-communist 
movement for democratization. 
The trade unions, which were inactive for a while after the prohibition of the 
February the First Strike, could hardly endure hunger and the low-wage policy of 
the Katayama Cabinet (the wage base was "1'1,800). Thus a demand arose among 
them for a fund for overcoming famine in July 1947. This was followed by a series 
of struggles for higher wages, and the unions "apparently took the offensive in June 
and, driving the workers to a large-scale struggle in the autumn, brought about a 
campaign in March the next year." 13) "On the 11 th September the union oflkegai 
Tekko Company got a wage base of¥4,600 (including tax), which was far higher 
than that of "I' I ,800 fixed by the Katayama Cabinet a few months before; successively 
the unions of Tokyo Kikai Company and Tsukijima Kikai Company got a wage 
base as high as the union of Ikegai Tekko Company had done." 14) 
Aming at breaking through the wage base of "1'1,800, the Japan Council of 
National and Local Government Workers' Unions-the All Japan Post-office Tele-
phone-Telegram Workers' Union, the National Railway Workers' Union, and 
others-also opened a struggle for higher wages. In the rally held at Matsue from 
the 11th till 14th of June 1947, the A.J.P.T.T.W.U. adopted such resolutions as 
'Let us enforce the minimum-wage system based on stabilized prices', 'Distribute 
the necessities of life at reasonable prices', and 'Let us establish a local system of 
subsistence wages'. In July the A.J.P.T.T.W.U. demanded that the government 
accept the resolutions, by force of 'local strikes'. This was a political struggle for 
establishing popular control over local and official authorities by continuously op-
posing them, which was, instead of the prohibited February the First General Strike, 
introduced by Sanbetsu Kaigi with the Communist Party behind it. A record of 
Sanbetsu Kaigi reads: 
The immediate opportunity for such a struggle to became prevalent was the pro-
hibition of the February the First General Strike. This oppression, which was brought 
upon the nation-wide struggle of a general strike, bore hard upon the power which had 
united all kinds of unions rather than the way of the struggle. To stand against such an 
oppressive measure the above-mentioned local political Jtruggle was brought into being. 
The foundation of such a local struggle was considered to be the workshop strife, which 
was to stand against the chief of a workshop and overcome him by the force of the union. 
Furthermore, it was prescribed to evolve into a local political struggle. Sanbetsu Kaigi 
and the industrial unions were regarded as the organizations to unite and direct work-
shop strifes and local struggles autonomously, though they were merely steps and stages 
in a large-scale political struggle and could_ be said from an object.ive point of view to be 
13) A ShOTt History of Sa.betsu Kaigi, p. 52. 
14) Ibid., p. 53. 
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in union with it. Such an organization had to spread rapidly15). 
The All-Japan Past-office and Telephone-Telegram Workers' and other public 
workers' unions had carried on a vehement struggle since August in demand for a 
living subsidy and succeeded in making the Central Labour Relations Commission 
authorize the payment of a 2.8 month living subsidy in November. Thus, they 
obtained the sum of two month's wages before the end of the year. But in the govern-
ment opposing opinions arose as to whether fares and postal charges should be rais-
ed or not, in order to provide the source of the remaining 0.8 of a month's sum for the 
living subsidy. This resulted in the general resignation of the Katayama Cabinet 
on the 10th February 1948. In the course of this struggle (which lasted from August 
till September), a large number of workers at post offices and on the Japanese 
National Railways simultaneously absented themselves from their offices and work-
shops. It was a "spontaneous action of those workers in one sense, but also some-
thing of an autonomous campaign in their offices."l6) It could be said to be to 
some extent the putting into practice of the local struggle. The government and 
Sodomei bitterly criticized it as a 'wildcat strike'. 
Out of such intense struggles between the government and the public workers' 
unions developed a democratizing movement against factional activities. A 
Short History if Sanbetsu Kaigi writes: 
Instigated by the anti~communist movement led by the Occupation Authorities, 
there grew a movement out of these [the intense struggles of the government and public 
workers' unionsl which was aimed at securing the hegemony of the union movement, 
and it became more and more active. The central committee of Sodomei opposed the 
strengthening of Zenroren (the National Liaison Council of Trade Unions) established 
just after the prohibition of the February the First General Strike: it advocated the es-
tablishment of a democratizing league of trade unions on the 13th January 1948. Also 
within Sanbetsu Kaigi some anti-communist groups began to grow-Nittsukai of the 
japan Express Company vVorkers' Union, Midorikai of the Japan Electric Power 
Industry Workers' Union and Minshuka-renmei of the japan Post-office and Telephone-
Telegram Workers' Union. An anti-communist league was organized in the Na-
tional Railway Workers' Union, too. In agreement with such a movement, splits in 
unions occurred one after another. The japan Federation of Coal Miners' Unions 
broke up on the 12th October 1947; the general meeting of the National Railway Wor-
kers' Union was adjourned owing to the disagreement between the leftwing and right-
wing factions on the 19th October 1947; the Radio Workers Union resolved to withdraw 
from Sanbetsu Kaigi on the 21st January 1948: the National League of Chemical In-
dustry Workers' Unions seceded from the National Council of Chemical Industry Wor-
kers' Unions on the 23rd February 1948. The establishment of the Democratizing 
League in Sanbetsu Kaigi on the 13th February 1948 was symbolic of an adventurous 
attempt to unite these anti-communist movements with union movements. The 
15) Ibid., p. 57. 
16) Ibid., p. 54. 
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Democratizing League insisted on stopping the communist group from carrying on ac~ 
tivities within Sanbetsu Kaigi and on democratizing the union movement. What was 
behind this insistence was the workers' desire for the autonomy of the trade union 17>. 
It was certain that such a democratizing movement was backed up by inter-
national anti-communist movements, the U.S. occupation forces, the japanese 
government, and capital. But if one takes these movements for a mere plot attempted 
by anti-communists, one overlooks the essence of the situation. For apparently the 
frequent splits were derived from the repulsion felt by ordinary union members ag-
ainst the high-handed leadership of Red Unionists. 
It discloses not only the short-sightedness of the view but also the evidence of the 
invaldity of political ideas that we regard it the democratizing movement] from only 
one aspect of the situations as an anti-communist movement, as some communits assert. 
A series of actions in the branch unions of the Japanese National Railway Union, the 
Japan Electric Power Industry Workers' Union, All-Japan Express Company Workers' 
Union, and All-Japan Press and Radio Workers' Union, seem to be regarded as an anti-
communist movement collectively. This is an opinion which does not grasp the essence 
of the problem. As a matter of course anti-communist elements are included, and even 
some anti-communist slogans seem to be put up. But this is just a phenomenon in 
which some took advantage of the public movement and not the essence of the move-
ments themselves. Even though there has risen a mood aganist the Communist Party 
in offices or unions, the working masses oppose neither the Communist Party nor com-
munism generally and politically, but they reject the inconsiderate, irresponsible fact-
ional actions of the Communist Party. It is an insult to them to call them anti-com-
munist simply because they have rejected the directions of the communist officials of 
Sanbetsu Kaigi 16). 
The statement quoted above may well be considered a correct explanation. 
The anti-communist movement in Europe, breaking up the World Federation 
of Trade Unions, brought into being the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions. But the break up caused no further split in unions within separate units 
of organization such as nation-wide institutions, industrial unions, craft unions, or 
general organizations. On the contrary, the disagreement between the communist 
and the anti-communist factions brought about the breakup of federations of 
unions, industrial unions, and intra-enterprise unions in japan. There was an es-
sential difference between Europe and japan in which an important problem was 
involved. 
Sanbetsu Kaigi, which could not take the Democratizing League for anything 
but the product of a plot to split it attempted by anti-communists, joined and guided 
the March struggle in 1948-a local one-of the All-japan Post-office and Tele-
phone and Telegram Workers' Union (it is said that there was serious antagonism 
17) Ibid., p. 61. 
18) Matsuta Hosoya, The Labour Movement at a Tllrning-Point~ p. 12. 
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between the communist and the democratizing factions) ; Sanbetsu Kaigi also con-
ducted the successive struggles of the government and public workers' unions last-
ing until June. As a result, internal antagonism grew more and more serious, and 
the failure of the struggle caused the democratizing movement to make rapid pro-
gress. 
In circumstances of still aggravated inflation and the consequent rise in prices, 
the newly established Ashida Cabinet decided to enforce a system of , Pay for the job' 
with a ¥2,290 base according to the report of the Temporary Wage and Allowance 
Investigation Committee. On proclaiming the decision, the cabinet ordered the 
Japan Council of National and Local Government Workers' Unions to stop their 
strike actions in many offices. But with the exception of the National Railway Wor-
kers' Union the others opposed the nature of the new wage system and the way of 
payment, and warned the government to accept their counterdemands. In the 
meantime strong local struggles were carried on in many regional offices. "The 
All-Japan Post-office and Telephone-Telegram Workers' Union had already been 
carrying on intense actions in a large number of local post-offices, including the 
strike at Osaka Central Post-office on the 25th February 1948. The strikes, which 
lasted for from three to seventy-two hours, were carried out by many office, local, 
and district unions until the 19th March, on which the Japan Council of National 
and Local Government Workers' Unions gave the warning to the government. 
Thus, the branch unions that took part in this struggle totalled 904; the members 
amounted to 247,754. As for government workers' unions other than the All-Japan 
Post-affice and Telephone-Telegram Workers' Union, the branch unions of the 
National Railway Workers' Union entered into struggles, and the National Finance 
Bureau Workers' Union used leave-of-absence tactics in concert with them on the 
15th March. In addition, the Japan Teachers' Union, the All-Japan General Con-
federation of Local Autonomy Government Workers' Unions, the Japan Electric 
Power Industry Workers' Union, and the All-Japan Coal Miners' Union struggled 
in many regions I9 ). 
As soon as the ¥2,920 wage base passed the Diet, the All-Japan Post-office 
and Telephone-Telegram Workers' Union proclaimed a strike on the 22nd March. 
I t negotiated with the government, but the negotiations came to a rupture. In 
consequence, the All-Japan Post-office Telephone-Telegram Workers' Union 
"went on a twenty-four hour strike in three regions from March 25th till 27th under 
the guidance of headquarters. Furthermore, the union decided to open a series of 
strikes from the 29th in the Eastern and Western districts at first and then through-
out the entire area of Japan. As for the National Railway Workers' Union, the 
branch unions of Hokkaido, Aomori, the home office, and Yokohama resolved the 
19) A Short Histm:y of SanbetJu Kni,gi, p. 63. 
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non-confidence of headquarters and ajoint strife with the Japan Council of National 
and Local Government Workers' Unions. Thut, they showed a firm attitude by 
being ready to go on strike. In sympathy with the Japan Council of National and 
Local Government Workers' Union, the All-Japan Machine & Instrument Industry 
Workers' Union and the All-Japan Electric Industry Workers' Union determined 
to go on a twenty-four hour strike and raise a fund for it. The All-J apan Coal Min-
ers' Union, which was carrying on local strikes, proposed that the All-Japan Post-
office and Telephone-Telegram Workers' Union join the struggle."") On this 
occasion theJ.P.T.T.W.U. agreed to go on a nation-wide strike on the 31st March, 
but an admiral at G.H.Q. requested it be stopped because it came under the pro-
hibition of the February the First General Strike. So the union was obliged to 
stop the nation-wide strike, but "it was changed into local strikes, so that the local 
councils in Tokai, Hokuriku, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu carried out 
strikes simultaneously in those districts. The occupation authorities also prohibited 
these local strikes on the 31st March 1948 because they were having a similar 
effect. "21) 
But this prohibition, however, failed to prevent the strikes completely. "The 
branch unions in Matsuyama, Miyagi, Osaka, and the International Department 
of the All-Japan Post-office and Telephone-Telegram Workers' Union, rejecting 
the prohibition, went on strike respectively from the 9th till 16th of April."") 
In spite of such rejections, the prohibition greatly influenced many unions, and the 
Japan Council on,rational and Local Government Workers' Unions reached an agre-
ement with the government, accepting the new wage base. 
This agreement, however, afforded no solution at all. For the aggravated in-
flation virtually cancelled out wages with a '1'2,920 base, so that the Japan Council 
of National and Local Government Workers' Unions, including the National Rail-
way Workers' Union which had at the very first accepted the '1'2,920 wage base, 
claimed on the 12thJune wages with a '1'5,200 base in opposition to the rise of'1'3, 791 
proposed by the government, together with other demands such as 'opposition to 
the revision of prices' and 'opposition to the additional imposition of mass taxes, 
and the establishment of a grievance committee'. Struggles began to "develop into 
popular district struggles, spreading on a nation-wide scale. "23) The All-Japan Post-
office and Telephone-Telegram Workers' Union "decided to run a large popular 
struggle in cooperation with farmers and other ordinary people; the National Rail-
way "Vorkers' Union transferred the right to strke to the central committee, reitera-
ting local strikes. The conference of the central committee of the A.j.P.T.T.W.U. 
held at Kanazawa adopted a local-struggle policy as to 'how the present struggles 
20) Ibid., pp. 63-64. 
21) Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
22) Ibid., p. 65. 
23) Minoru Takano, np. fit., p. 78. 
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should be carried out'."") 
Under such circumstances General MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister 
Ashida on the 22nd July, suggesting the idea of amending the Public Service Law 
completely and of adopting the institution of public corporations. In response 
to General MacArthur's suggestion, the Ashida Cabinet promulgated Cabinet 
Order No. 201 on the 31st July, restricting the rights to strike and collective barga-
mmg. Opposing the action of the government, the National Railway Workers' 
Union and the A.J.P.T.T.W.U. declared a state of emergency. The Hokkaido Shin-
toku branch union of the N.R.W.U. and other unions collectively deserted their 
jobs. Similar collective desertions and absences of workers from workshops oc-
curred in the A.J.P.T.T.W.U. They made appeals for the defence of the Consti-
tution of Japan, national independence, and anti· fascism. It is said that all the 
union members who deserted their jobs (amounting to more than one thousand) 
suffered administrative measures. 
Cabinet Order No. 201 was a threat against the right of organization involving 
a crisis for democracy. For, first, by virtue of the revised National Public Service 
Law (December 1948) and the Public Corporation Labour Relations Law (Decem-
ber 1948) desk-working public servants were completely deprived of the rights to 
strike and collective bargaining, and operative public servants were also deprived of 
the right to strike though they were allowed to hold the right of collective bargaining; 
and secondly, the right to strike was the core of democracy. It should not, however, 
be overlooked that what had brought the MacArthur letter and Cabinet Order No. 
20 I was a violent struggle for power as shown in the case of the March and July 
struggles of the A.J.P.T.T.W.U. It had clearly been foreseen because of the pro-
hibitions of the February the First General Strike and the March struggle that 
the struggles of public servants for political power might be suppressed. And 
"what was derived from the actions of these two great unions, which were excited by 
the MacArthur letter, declaring a state of emergency, and which carried out coll-
ective absence and desertion of workers from workshops, was only the development 
of the democratizing factions."") Sanbetsu Kaigi itself admitted the fact, yet attri-
buted the cause to the splitting policy of the anti-communist democratizing factions. 
Thus Sanbetsu Kaigi leaned further towards the struggle for political power: 
The Democratizing League of Sanbetsu Kaigi held the first national convention on 
the 12th june 1948. Sodomei withdrew from Zenroren (the Liaison Council of All 
Trade Unions of japan) on the 28th june. The Democratizing League and Sodomei, 
in cooperation with each other, organized a democratizing league or a second union 
within main organizations of Sanbetsu Kaigi. These powers being gradually st-
rengthened, the workers' struggle was faced with increased internal difficulties. Con-
24) Ibid., p. 79. 
25) Matsuta Hosaya, The Trade V,doll Movement in Japan, p. 113. 
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sequently " new problem was brought forth which was different from the pre-March-
struggle days; the actions of Sanbetsu Kaigi came to be restricted little by little. It 
tried to spread the united front by virtue of political demands, adopting a policy more 
and more opposed to the democratizing factions and others. 
Soon after the promulgation of Cabinet Order No. 201 the Preparatory Council of 
the Democracy Defence League started activities (the 27th August), with Sanbetsu Kai-
gi and Zenroren as its central institutions. The preparatory council intended to make 
a democratic national front. 
Under the circumstances as stated above, the fourth convention of Sanhetsu Kaigi 
was held from the 19th till 22nd of November 1948. In it was resolved a proposition 
that the Democratizing League should dissolve itself, so that fifty-two delegates of the 
faction left the meeting (the participants amounted to 500). The reason was said to 
be that their actions since February had been against the workers. The convention 
adopted slogans for the defending the worker's right to earn his living and industry be-
cause doing so was to defend democracy and national independence. As a method of 
struggle the 'graded struggle'26) was emphasized27). 
The resolution for the dissolution of the Democratizing League adopted at the 
fourth convention of Sanbetsu Kaigi failed to stop the democratizing movement; 
indeed it brought about the contrary effect of formating its national organization"). 
The very cause for the growth of the democratizing movement was that Sanbetsu 
Kaigi had persistently been forcing workers into the struggle for power. 
In 1949, inflation was reduced by force of the Dodge Policy; large-scale in-
dustrial adjustments and mass discharges were carried out. The communist and 
democratizing factions opposed each other, which resulted in the defeat of the for-
26) The graded struggle adopted by the central committee of the All-Japan Post-office and Tele-
phone-Telegram Workers' Union on the 1st September 1948 "is not a unified struggle~ but a st-
ruggle policy to act according to the workers' power and self-consciousness; it is an invisible 
methodical campaign to be concentrated, not by formal instructions, but by the workers' intense 
fighting spirit". (A Short History if Sanb,tsll Kaigi, p. 71.) 
27) A Short History of Sanbetsll Kaigi~ pp. 79-80. 
28) In opposition to the resolution of disorganization, the Democratizing League announced: \Ve 
cannot subject ourselves to the decision of the managing board. For there is no reason for pro-
hibiting only our actions without removing other factions. Since we have thirteen out of nine-
teen members of the managing board and more than thirty out of forty-nine members of the ex-
ecutive committee belonging to the communist faction in Sanbetsu Kaigi today, we cannot discuss 
matters in a democratic way. Resigning OUT position as vice-chairman, secretaries, and clerks, 
we will carry out a struggle supported by the working masses for achieving the objects of the De-
mocratizing League. 
On the 24th ,february they had a round-table conference with uver 200 participants froln Soda-
mei, the National Railway Workers' Union, the Japan Federation of Coal Miners' Unions, the 
General Federation o[Ship Building Workers' Unions, and LheJapan General Federation ofPri-
vate Railways Workers' Unions. They agreed to act in concert (Report afJuly 26th edit., by the 
National Democratizing Council of Trade Unions). The Democratizing League of Sanbetsu Kaigi 
held, on the 12th and 13th of July 1948, the first national rally where they announced its classified 
membership as foHows: 
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mer. Aggravated American-Soviet relations and the developing anti-communist 
policy of the U.S., together with the success of the Communist Revolution in China 
(lasting from December 1948 till October 1949), greatly heightened the position of 
Japan as an 'anti-communist base' in Asia, and changed U.S. diplomatic policy 
towards Japan to a large extent. The U.S. government, having laid emphasis on 
the demilitarization and democratization of Japan and having entrusted the rehabi-
litation of the economy to her autonomously in spite of American economic assistance, 
expected the early achievement of Japan's independence. Thus in December 1948 
aU .S. government order was sent in the form of General MacArthur's letter to Prime 
minister Yoshida, in which nine principles for rehabilitation of Japan were in-
dicated, for purposes of enforcing a single rate of exchange and ending the inflation 
in the shortest possible time. J.M. Dodge, the then President of the Bank of Detroit, 
was despatched to Japan to carry out the nine economic principles. 
The inflation caused by the deficit financing and the financing by the Recon-
struction Finance Bank rapidly came [Q an end in consequence of this measure. 
Then, the single exchange rate of one dollar to three hundred and sixty yen was 
established. Inflation was converted into deflation. On the occasion when in-
dustrial adjustment and mass discharges were being carried out, the autonomous 





































(Sanzo Kawasaki, The Trends of Labollr Movements in Post- War Japan, p. 71.) 
List of the Abbreviated Names of the Unions in the Table: A.J.P.T.T.W.U.-The All-Japan 
Post-ollice and Telephone-Telegram Workers' Union;J.E.P.I.W.U.-TheJapan Electric Power 
Industry Workers' Union; A.J.E.C.W.U.-The All-Japan Express Company Workers' Union; 
A.J.H.W.U.-The All-Japan Harbour Workers' Union; A.J.E.I.W.U.-The All-Japan Electric 
Industry Workers' Union; N.F.L.I.W.U.-The National Federation of Life Insurance Wor-
kers' V.nion; A.J.M.I.I.W.U.-The All-Japan Machine & Instrument Industry Workers' 
Union; A.].G.F.W.U.-The AIl,Japan Garrison Forces Workers' Union; J.C.I.W.U.-The 
Japan Chemical Industry Workers' Union; j.F.I.S.I.vV.U.-The Japan Federation of Iron & 
Steel Industry Workers' Union; F.R.S.I.W.U.-The Federation of Rolling Stock Industry 
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(Source: Ministry of Labour, Annual Report of Labour Statistics and Investigation in 1949, 1950.) 
Under cover of the deflation caused by the nine economic principles,") the 
government and private enterprise carried out mass discharges which they could 
have hardly done on account of labour offensives. Besides, they purged the leftwing 
radicals from enterprises with the tacit approval of the democratizing factions. The 
purge implied that Japan's economic rehabilitation was being carried out in the 
way capital had wanted to have it done. In response, Sanbetsu Kaigi, regarding 
this measure as industrial destruction planned by monopolistic capital, opened an 
industrial defence struggle and organized an industrial defence council in every im-
portant industry. 
At the same time local defence councils were set up. And in Yubari, Gumma, and 
29) A deflationary policy directed by the American banker Joseph M. Dodge. All the expen-
diture of the national and local government offices were to be paid out of taxes, and all deficit-
covering bonds were prohibited. This was an application of the nine economic principlts 
and was aimed at the establishment of a single exchange rate in the shortest possible time. 
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Adjusted Enterprises & Personnel Dismissed in Private Enterprise 
Month Number of Adjusted Number of Personnel Enterprises Dismissed 
1949 Feb. 218 7,480 
Mar. 479 15,349 
Apr. 513 26,299 
May 833 31,911 
june 941 40,840 
july 1,241 99,629 
Aug. 1,330 73,546 
Sept. 1,071 44,264 
Oct. 748 33,552 
Nov. 645 32,468 
Dec. 795 30,132 
8,814 (Total) 435,465 (Total) 
.. 
(Source: Ministry of Labour, Report of the Labour Market Survey Section.) 
many other districts struggles were carried out against local self-governing bodies under 
such slogans as 'Defend our homel' and 'Defend Industry J'. It was planned to raise 
a struggle against the Yoshida Cabinet by involving terminal authorities in it. Such 
were the tactics used by Sanbetsu Kaigi. The fifth extensive executive committee of 
Sanbetsu Kaigi held on the 23rd and 24th of june 1949 adopted a policy in respect to 
the industrial defence struggle as shown below: 
1) By collecting workers' claims in the workshop strife, we are to start a mass 
movement, control workshops and offices autonomously, and manage them as the 
working masses wish. 
2) We are to have the progressive national capital observe the claims of the 
workers and grapple with monopolistic capital's policy of centralized production. 
3) By extending the industrial defence struggle into workshops and management, 
and connecting it with the basic and correlated industries, with farmers, and with other 
people, we are to have local self-governing bodies stand for the struggle to defend home 
industries. 
4) By extending local strifes to a national struggle which is to be developed into a 
political struggle for overthrowing the Yoshida Cabinet, we are to have collective bar-
gaining with the government and demand the opening of an extra session of the Diet'O). 
The policy mentioned above was the same struggle policy as that oflocal strug-
gles taken after the prohibition of the February the First General Strike. In ad-
dition, it was the cause of bringing the Democratizing League within Sanbestu 
Kaigi; it was nothing but the struggle policy which had completely been frustrated 
by the oppression of the authorities. I t was natural, therefore, that such a struggle 
30) A Short History of Sanbetsu Kaigi, p. 80. 
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policy was not backed up by the working masses. Because of it, on the contrary, 
Sanbetsu Kaigi was made to stand alone, and many industrial unions seceded from 
it. And to the inaugural meeting of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions held in London in November 1949 the National Railway Workers' Union, 
All-Japan Post-office and Telephone-Telegram Workers' Union, All-Japan Coal 
Miners' Union, and Japan Teachers' Union sent their representatives. 
The Democratizing League of Sanbetsu Kaigi as well as Sodomei admitted the 
necessity of putting the nine economic principles into operation, struggling to solve 
the actual problems which would arise in process of their enforcement. In oppo-
sition to Sanbetsu Kaigi, Sodomei held on the 19th November 1949 a preparatory 
meeting for organizing a national congress of trade unions; the Democratizing 
League of Sanbetsu Kaigi formed Shinsanbetsu (the New National Federation of 
Industrial Organizations) on the 10th December 1949. In March 1950 a pre-
paratory meeting for the formation of Sohyo (the General Council of Trade Unions 
of Japan) was held; in July Sohyo was organized, which has occupied the most pro-
minent position in the labour movement of Japan until today. Sanbetsu Kaigi 
rapidly lost its influence on trade unions, thus actually ceasing to exist. 
Now I would like to touch on the mass discharges in the National Railway Wor-
kers' Union and All Communications Employees' Union. They were carried out 
by force of the Public Corporation Labour Relations Law, which deprived the wor-
kers of the N.R.W.U. and A.].P.T.T.W.U. of the right to strike. Enforcing the 
Personnel Strength Law on the 30th May, the government planned to discharge 
420,365 officials belonging to administrative organs, including 120,413 workers of 
the N.R.W.U. The struggle against this plan arose on the occasion of the Tokyo 
Railway Bureau of enforcing on the 1st June a new system of working conditions for 
guards, including a fifteen minute extension of working hours. On the 9th June the 
Guards' Station and Electric Train Station at Higashikanagawa went on strike and 
this strike spread to the Guards' Stations at Kamata and Nakano, and the the 
Electric Train Stations at Nakano, Mitaka, and Shimojujo. Consequently the 
operation of electric trains was stopped for three days on the main lines around 
Tokyo. The authorities subjected nineteen leaders of this struggle to disciplinary 
dismissal, also accusing them before the Public Procurators Office. As soon as this 
disciplinary measure was announced, the Guards' Stations at Higashikanagawa and 
other places went on strike one after another, and strife extended over all Tokyo 
districts. Furthermore, a council of representatives of factories was held in Kana-
gawa. Jointly conducted by the members of the council of representatives of 
factories and the workers of the N.R.W.U., 'people's electric trains' ran along the 
Yokohama Line and Keihin Tohoku Line. They amounted to more than ten ser-
vices 31 ). 
31) Ibid., p. 90. 
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The 'people's electric trians' were prohibited by the occupation forces. The 
National Railway Workers' Union, holding the fifteenth central committee from the 
23rd till 25th of June in preparation for administrative readjustment, decided to 
take action including strikes if the worst came to the worst. On the 4th July the 
authorities of the Japanese National Railways gave the first dismissal notices to 
30,700 workers. 
On the next day both the N.R.W.U. and A.J.P.T.T.W.U. declared a joint de-
fence struggle, entering into action32). A little later there occurred the so-called 
'Shimoyama Incident' in which Mr. Shimoyama, the then President of the Japanese 
National Railways, was murdered, being found as if he had committed suicide by 
throwing himself under a train. Because of this incident the struggle seemed to be-
came dispirited. Under such circumstances the second batch of notices of dismis-
sal was given to 63,000 workers on the 13th July. Thus the struggle reached a ser-
ious stage"), when the so-called 'Mitaka Accident' occurred on the 15th. This was 
a case in which an electric train with no motorman ran for some reason into Mitaka 
Station on the Chilo Line. On the 18th the authorities dismissed twelve com-
munists of the leftwing faction in the central struggle committee of the N.R.W.U. and 
five members of Kakushin Doshikai (the Reformist Group), an intermediate faction 
between the communist and democratizing factions34). The struggle was frustrated; 
the democratizing faction controlled the central struggle committee, and holding 
the seventh extraordinary convention from the 10th till 13th of October, succeeded 
in completely controlling the National Railway Workers' Union. 
On the 12th August there was a mass discharge of workers of the All-Japan 
Post-office and Telephone-Telegram Workers' Union, to which 26,500 workers 
including twenty-six members of the central struggle committee were subjected. In 
the nineth central committee held in Kamisuwa from the 12th till 14th of September 
there was a heated debate concerning the term, 'anti-working', used abaut Saiken 
Domei (the Reconstruction League), one of the democratizing factions. Central 
committeeman Takaragi, the then Head Official of the Reconstruction League and 
the present chairman of the All-Japan Post-office and Telephone-Telegram Wor-
kers' Union, insisted that "a union movement that carries on such illegal struggles 
that victims are inevitably increased is in itself against the workers .... we now 
have to part from the Communist Party." Thus, the members of the Reconstruction 
League left the committee, and the union broke up. "As soon as the All-Japan Post-
office and Telephone-Telegram Workers' Union was split, the masses dispersed. 
The split in the A.J.P.T.T.W.U. resulted in the complete breakdown of the Or-
32) Ibid., p. 90. 
33) Ibid., p. 91. 
34) The central struggle committee consisted of nineteen members of the communist faction~ nine of 
the reform faction, and fourteen of the democratizing faction. 
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ganization."35) 
About the time of the mass discharges in the N.R.W.U. and A.].P.T.T.W.U., 
similar dismissals were being announced in one large union after another in private 
industry. As a result of these mass dismissals, workers were beginning to make a stand 
against management. The anti-dismissal struggle of the Toshiba Electric Company 
Workers' Union was the core of these. "The local-joint-strife organizations which 
consisted mainly of the N.R.W.U. and Toshiba Electric Company Workers' Union 
were set up at the places where Toshiba factories were located. The A.j.P.T.T.W.U., 
other government and public workers' unions, and the trade unions of private indus-
tries were connected to one another around the local-joint-strife organizations. The 
joint struggle of the National Railway and the Toshiba Workers' Unions was gener-
alized in the form of local people's struggles. And these unions were inclined to 
employ and raising campaigns in the street even when they repeated rather strong 
struggles; these struggles could not be concentrated into the single struggle of a 
single organization throughout the entire period of the struggle, so that these unions 
carne to lose the functions of trade unions. Thus, these local people's struggles 
turned out, in many cases, to be manipulated by the local organs of the Communist 
Party."36) 
The intense joint struggle of the Toshiba, National Railways, and other unions, 
which was directed by the communists who advocted a September revolution, col-
lasped at a stroke owing to the Matsukawa Accident of 17th September (a case 
where a train was overturned near Matsukawa on the Tohoku Line causing a few 
causalities). 
The government announced that the train had been overturned by members 
of the Communist Party and suppressed the struggle. The three things- the Shi-
moyama Incident, Mitaka Accident, and Matsukawa Accident occurred coinciden-
tally when the struggles were nearing their climax and owing to these incidents the 
mass discharges turned out well. 
It is said that those who were dismissed in consequence of industrial readjust-
ment and the closing and insolvency of enterprises amounted to one million. De-
layed payment and non-payment of wages covered the entire industry. In this way 
intense antagonism was brought into being between labour and management. The 
Communist Party and Sanbetsu Kaigi were always faithful to their guiding principle 
of the struggle for revolutionary power, which gave rise to the democratizing faction 
within the latter and led to its collapse. 
The japanese government, with the occupation forces behind it, took up a 
capitalistic way of reconstructing the japanese economy, whereas Sanbetsu Kaigi, 
with the Communist Party behind, insisted on a proletarian method, as mentioned 
35) Ichiro Saito. A History of tlte Labour Movement in Post-War Japan, Part I, p. 271. 
36) Ibid., p. 270. 
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above. The antagonistic contention between the government and Sanbetsu Kaigi 
in regard to the economic rehabilitation of Japan ended in the complete victory of 
the former. For in the process of contention the latter brought forth the anti-
communist power of the Democratizing League which was cooperative with the 
former and stood against the organization itself Sanbetsu Kaigi and the Com-
munist Party intensely opposed the capitalistic way of economic reconstruction, 
from a political point of view but failed to restrict it at all. It might well be said 
that the then communists neither understood nor tried to understand the union 
function of regulating wages, working conditions and employment. It was quite 
natural, too, that the communists who were straightforwardly advancing towards 
'revolution' did not try to understand it within the framework of capitalism. Here 
lay a tragedy. For, in spite of the inevitable growth of the democratizing factions 
which 'cooperated' in, yet 'opposed' and 'struggled' against the capitalistic way of 
economic reconstruction of Japan then in progress, the communists merely regarded 
it as a machination of anti-communist seceders. 
The process in which the democratizing factions prospered, whereas Sanbetsu 
Kaigi declined, was also the one by which industrial unions- they were nothing 
but industrial federations of intra-enterprise unions- and intra-enterprise unions 
continually broke up. It was also the process by which second unions came into 
being and increased their influence. Sahya was precisely a nation-wide, concentrat-
ed organization of such second unions. The separation of trade unions was made 
mainly on the pretext of opposition against radical leftist guidance. The following 
items are some of the examples of a large number of splits in unions in the history of 
the labour movement after World War II, especially after the prohibition of the 
February the First General Strike :37) 
Ex. l. The Imperial Oil Company Workers' Union (belonging to Sanbetsu Kaigi). 
In process of the struggle for collective agreement those who were dissatisfied with the 
dictatorial, demagogic attitude of their union officials separated from the union, and 
forming a second union on the 20th September 1946, took part in Slldllmei. The 
management backed up the separated union positively. Later both unions were 
amalgamated; the amalgamated union established the National Council of Petroleum 
Industry Workers' Unions, in cooperation with the Japan Petroleum Company Workers' 
Union and others, to join Sanhetsu Kaigi. But the Imperial Oil Company Workers' 
Union again seceded from N.C.P.I.W.U. and Sanbetsu Kaigi on the 3rd January 1949. 
Ex. 2. The Northeastern Metalworking Company Workers' Union (belonging to 
S1idllmei). Owing to delayed payment and the difficulty of achieving the sliding-scale 
system of wages secessionists insisted on the opinion that 'they should make a union 
movement in consideration of the business conditions of the company, for the present 
union seems to have gone too far'. Thus, the secessionists formed a second union on the 
37) The Labour Administrative Research J nstitute, The Conditions oj the Present Labotlr Movement, pp. 
7-8. See also ,,,Takan Fujita, The Second Union. 
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14th June 1948, which the management positively approved. 
Ex. 3. Mitsubishi Mihara Rolling Stock Manfacturing Factory Workers' Union 
(belonging to the National Council of Rolling Stock Manufacturing Industry Workers' 
Unions and Sanbetsu Kaigi). Taking advantage of the anti-communist movement on a 
nation-wide scale, some members advocated driving out the communist faction and 
separated from the union to set up a second union (the 24th March 1948). But those 
who were dissatisfied with the leaders of the second union as making too much of the 
Socialist Party seceded once again from it to form a third union. 
Ex. 4. The Kawasaki Heavy Industry Company Workers' Union (belonging to 
the Japan Federation of Iron & Steel Industry Workers' Unions and Sanbetsu Kaigi). 
Denouncing the dispute as ideological and political, those who were discontented with-
drew from the union in succession in April 1948 and formed three unions. 
Ex. 5. The Japan Radio Workers' Union (belonging to the Federation of Press & 
Radio Workers' Unions and Sanbetsu Kaigi). Some members criticized the 'struggle 
for struggle's sake', and separating from the union for want of autonomy, organized 
the Japan Federation of Radio Workers' Unions on the 2nd March 1948. 
Ex. 6. The Asahi Newspaper Workers' Union (belonging to the Federation of 
Press & Radio Workers' Unions). Owing to the deadlocked struggle for the sliding-
scale system of wages and collective agreement, and to the offensive of capital, the union 
split into six in October 1948. 
Ex. 7. The Japan Typewriter Manufacturing Company Workers' Union (belong-
ing to the All-Japan Federation of Machine & Instrument Industry Workers' Unions 
and Sanbetsu Kaigi). Those who opposed the struggle for managing production set 
up a second union on the 19th November 1948. Both unions brought about trouble 
between them concerning entering the factory. 
Ex. 8. The Japan Instrument Manufacturing Company Workers' Union (belong-
ing to the Japan Federation of Iron & Steel Industry Workers' Unions and Sanbetsu 
Kaigi). Those who regarded the struggles ofJ.F.I.S.I.W.U. as ideological and political 
and incapable of solving serious economic claims split into four unions in May 1948. 
At the fifth convention of Sanbetsu Kaigi held from the 28th till 30th of 
November 1949, which was held while the organization was on the verge of col-
lapse, the declaration adopted emphasized that "every worker should claim a work-
shop and wage worthy of his labour; and complete independence and peace derived 
from an over-all peace treaty should be achieved."") As the policy of the struggle 
the following were also stressed :-" to open unified action with ordinary claims, to 
adopt as tactics the setting-up of a workshop committee, factory representative com-
mittee, and to purge secessionists from the labour front by force of the unified action 
of the working masses."") But this struggle policy only helped increase the 
continual secessions. It may well be said that the tragic destiny of Sanbetsu Kaigi 
lay in that the leaders were unaware of such a situation in spite of many bitter ex-
periences. 
38) A Short History of Sanbetsu Kaigi, p. 93. 
39) Ibid., p. 94. 
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Owing to the mass discharges in 1949, communists and many of their sympa-
thizers had been pruged from enterprises. Again in 1950 almost 19,200 'fighting 
workers' were dismissed from every industry in the so-called Red Purge beginning 
in June, a little before the breakout of the Korean War, and ending in December. 
As a result most of the leftists lost their positions in their enterprises. Every organ 
of the trade unions was completely controlled by the democratizing faction. "The 
Red Purge was carried out by management and government in accordance with 
the orders of the occupation authorities ... , more than two thousand personnels in 
the electric and coal mining industries respectively, and more than four thousand 
personnel in the iron and steel and chemical industries and the government organs 
respectively were the main victims."'O) 
Before the Red Purge, labour struggles which followed the year-end struggle of 
1949 became active; these were concentrated in the March struggle. The "March 
struggle turned out to consist of strikes in large enterprises, spreading widely; it was 
supported by the working masses who helped the unions hold demonstrations in their 
workshops, hold workers' mutual interchanges of different workshops, and set up 
local joint-meetings of workers and joint-struggle councils."'!) What was most noti-
ceable in the development of the struggles was the one of the Federation of All 
Hitachi Manufacturing Company Workers' Unions which was called the 'last strug-
gle to make or break Sanbetsu Kaigi' .") 
By submitting a wage demand for a ¥12,OOO rise on the 4th April, the Federation of 
All Hitachi Manufacturing Company Workers' Unions went on strike in all the factories. 
But the management rejected the demand and instead proclaimed the adoption of a 
'pay for the job' system and the dismissal of 5,555 personnels. The All-Japan Metal 
Industry Workers' Union fought with all its might, taking management's measure for 
the causes of low wages, intensification of labour, and war in the long run, in order to 
suppress secessionists' maneuvers, to realize autonomous management of factories, that 
is, of production, to accept a wide range of problems from workers, to prepare for the 
prolongation of the struggle, and to involve the families of workers in the struggle. Cen-
tering around the four factories of Hitachi in Ibaraki district, a large-scale meeting in 
which the workers' families also took part, local joint struggles, demonstrations, the gen-
eral strike directed by the Federation, and local strikes of Hitachi workers and the wor-
kers of other enterprises together-these were the ways and means of the struggle43 >, 
In this struggle too, the leaders and active members of the unions were arrested, 
which aggravated the struggle; on the 10th August the Federation accepted the pro-
posal of the management to end the struggle. This was a significant event which 
symbolized the frustration of the struggle policy of Sanbetsu Kaigi. On the 29th 
40) Ibid., p. 110. 
41) Ibid., pp. 100~101. 
42) Ibid., p. 101. 
43) Ibid., p. 101. 
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October, two months later, the Japan Electric Power Industry Workers' Union de-
cided to withdraw from Sanbetsu Kaigi. 
General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Occupation Forces in 
Japan, ordered' the purge ef all twenty-four members of the central committee of 
the Communist Party on the 6th June, and of the leaders of the Red Flag on the next 
day. He furthermore prohibited the issue of the Red Flag on the 26th June, which 
was the day following the breakout of the Korean War, and that of the bulletins of 
lower organs of the Communist Party on the 17th July. He also ordered the dis-
solution of the Liaison Council of All Trade Unions of Japan, purging twelve execu-
tives. The afore-mentioned Red Purge was put in force under such circumstances. 
In contrast with the methodical suppression of communists and their sympathi-
zers, the General Headquarters played an important role in the establishment of 
Sohyo (the 11 th July) through its methodical guidance of and interference in the 
democratizing factions. In regard to this situation Mr. Matsuta Hosoya states: 
The occuaption authorities, who had despatched five Japanese delegates to the in-
augural meeting of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions held in 
London, began to playa positive part in the unified movement with their conceptions. 
The authorities sent members of the Labour Section to persuade powerful industrial un-
ions to follow the unifying policy. At the same time they invited the representatives 
of powerful industrial unions -this was opposed by some members of the national pre-
paratory meeting for unifying trade unions-and tried by force of suppression to make 
those unions observe the intentions of the authorities. In addition, the membres of 
the Labour Section themselves tried to reorganize the unions of the iron and steel indu-
stry and of harbor works. Thus, Sohyo was interfered with by the occupation authori-
ties at the very beginning of its formation44). 
Such circumstances prevented Shinsanbetsu (the New National Federation of 
Industrial Organizations) which insisted on the autonomy of trade unions from 
taking part in Sohyo. Concerning the amalgamation of Sodomei into Sohyo there 
was antagonism between leftists and rightists, which caused the breakup of Sodomei: 
the leftists amalgamated themselves into Sohyo whereas the rightists remained in 
Sodomei and strengthened the organization. So Sohyo started its activity with three 
million five hundred thousand members from nineteen industrial unions. In the 
meantime "the democratizing faction which succeeded in removing the control of 
unions from the communist faction could neither exclude the interference of the oc-
cupation authorities nor achieve the unification of trade unions for itself."") 
Sohyo stated in the declaration at its rally that "we are to exclude the Japan 
Communist Party's control of unions and the policy of a Bolshevistic revolution." 
Its fundamental principles acceeded to the spirit of those of the I.C.F.T.U., but 
44) Matsuta Hosoya, The Labour Nlovement in Japan, p. 121-122. 
45) Ibid .• p. 123. 
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"did not reveal any clear direction in respect to some urgent problems such as those 
of organization and ordinary struggles."") Sohyo, which was established with the 
assistance of the occupation forces and the tacit support of management, lamented 
its ill luck as a 'Potsdam union' and could not so far pronounce what to do; yet it was 
of great significance that the organization was actually established. The event was 
symptomatic of the termination of a labour movement whose leaders aimed at acquir-
ing revolutionary power. I t also indicated the reestablishment of the wage system 
based on seniority and of intra-enterprise unions based on this system, in short, the 
reestablishment of the old] apanese labour-management relations. 
While Sanbetsu Kaigi and the respective industrial unions and trade unions be-
longing to it were fighting against political power, 'occupation power', and local 
power, the democratizing factions were being formed in opposition to them; and the 
empolyees' union-the intra-enterprise union, namely, the indipendent trade union 
within an enterprise-which was in accord with the payability of the enterprise was 
steadily securing its footing in many enterprises. 
IV The Establish11lent of Japanese Labour-Manage11lent Relations 
and its Significance 
The leaders of the struggles for higher wages in the days of Sanbetsu Kaigi had 
adhered to the policy of raising the wage base; they had hardly regulated wages and 
other working conditions in accordance with occupations and industries except for 
the Densan wage system, nor had they intended to do so. For political purposes 
they had cooperated, but for economic ones they had had no authority to regulate 
wages and other working conditions throughout industrial unions. These had been 
solely determined by management at their own convenience inside the enterprise; 
on the contrary, the intra-enterprise union could only have influenced management 
to increase the wage base and against the intensification of labour, the rationalization 
of production, and the dismissal of personnel to some extent. 
In paying wages to respective workers according to the wage base fixed before-
hand, management assessed a worker in accordance with the standards of school 
career, employment type (normal of new graduates, intermediate employment, 
regular or temporary empolyment and so on), seniority (length of service) and 'degree 
of contribution to the enterprise'. Thus, they succeeded in completely commanding 
the right of assessment. This was how the wage system based on seniority, that is, 
an intra-enterprise system of wages, derived from the payability of the enterprise and 
not regulated autonomously on the occupational and industrial levels came to be 
established. 
The second union, which had been formed in opposition to the struggle for 
46) Ibid., p. 123. 
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power and to the radical leaders 'neglecting the real circumstances of the enterpri-
ses' and on the basis of the seniority-wage system, turned into the intra-enterprise 
union which gave consideration to the payability of the enterprise. The second 
union secured its position as the intra-enterprise union in Japanese labour-manage-
ment relations by holding the leadership in the union movement. The establish-
ment of Sohyo showed exactly how Japanese labour-management relations had been 
built up on the basis of the seniority-wage system and the intra-enterprise union. 
The industrial union had neither the authority to conclude collective bargaining 
nor that to strike; it was nothing but an industrial organ of intra-enterprise unions 
for purposes of liaison and joint struggle. As a result complete autonomy was 
enjoyed by the leaders of intra-enterprise union. Those who were qualified to be 
members or officials of sach unions were legally limited to the employees of an 
enterprise. Consequently, dismissed and retired employees would lose their qualifi-
cation for membership and leadership of the union. 
The Public Corporation Labour Relations Law regulates this in Clause 3, Article 
4: Those who are not employees of public corporations cannot be members or 
officials of the employees' unions of public corporations. Under such circumstances 
the basis of workers' combination on the occupational and industrial levels com-
pletely lost; workers' combination can be admitted only in respective enterprises. 
In consequence of the seniority-wage system in which management command the 
right to distribute wages, however, employees of an enterprise are made to be com-
petent with one another. As a result workers' combination in respective enterprises 
becomes a weak one involving the possibility of incessant breaks-up in the trade 
unlons. 
Oligopolistic enterprises control the sum total of wages by means of a wage base, 
and also the assessment of payment by means of the seniority-wage system. Adher-
ing to a low-wage policy and managing to improve the efficiency of labour, they fix 
the sum of the labour cost after setting aside a certain sum for profit. Being intra-
enterprise unions which are in favour of the payability of the enterprise, Japanese 
trade unions fail to break through such policies of enterprises. If they try to do so, 
they break themselves up. Thus, seniority-based labour-management relations are 
nothing but primitive capitalist labour-management relations. 
In such labour-management relations, the functions of an intra-enterprise union 
are not to regulate wages and other working conditions, but to open a struggle for 
a higher wage base, absolutely to oppose the dismissal of workers, the intensification 
of labour, the rationalization of production, and the transposition and degradation of 
workers, and to influence management. In such conditions, no definite rate of 
wages exists nor does a rule of rise in pay and promotion; the range of, the authority 
over, and the responsibility for business are indefinite; labour is irregular; and the 
full number of personnel and the quantity of work are not prescribed. Here there 
are no restrictive practices fixed by autonomous and compulsory regulations about 
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wages and other working conditions, the most important objects for a trade union. 
An employed worker is exclusively protected from the offensive oflow-wage workers 
in minor enterprises by his status and continuous service in and his loyalty to the 
enterprise; ifhis continuous service, industry, and loyalty were admitted by manage-
ment, he would be able to gain exclusive promotion. 
What strengthens seniority-based labour-management relations are the welfare 
facilities in the enterprise, such as company houses or retiring allowances. In such 
relations even the benefit of a health insurance society (which is to be set up in an 
enterprise having more than 1,000 employees.) has the function ofa welfare facility. 
All these welfare facilities subordinate employees materially and psychologically to 
the enterprise. Then, what vicissitude have the seniority-based labour-management 
relations undergone, which were established on the occasion of the formation of 
Sohyo? This will be the subject to be discussed later. 
